Hi! I want to try out fedora workstation in the near future (once 39 is out) and was wondering if systemd-homed is ready for everyday use yet.
I’m a bit paranoid and really need my private data encrypted. However, I don’t think that full disk encryption is practical for my daily use. Therefore I was really looking forward to the encryption possibilities of systemd-homed.
However, after reading up on it, I was a bit discouraged. AFAIK, there’s no option to setup systemd-homed at installation (of fedora). I was an Arch then Manjaro, then Endeavour user for years but don’t have the time/patience anymore to configure major parrts of my system anymore. Also, the documentation doesn’t seem too noob-friendly to me, which also plays into the time/patience argument.
Is it ready? Can anyone seriously recommend it for a lazy ex-Arch user who doesn’t want to break another linux installation?
Thank you in advance. :)
I’m not advocating for this right now, but yes that is why when using TPM password, one must insure to enable secure boot, enable bios password, disable boot media, and disable grub editing. That’s the recommended proceedure for this setup.
This is essentially how HEADs works too. Some very smart people have worked on TPM boot and it is even built into systemd. You’re just wrong here.
Reference:
Whether I would fully rely on the systems proper operation against a state sponsored adversary is a different question though.
Here is an alternative Piped link(s):
Matthew Garrett - TPM based attention
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Ah yes security brought to you by the same folks who brought you “bypass encryption by holding down the enter key” and “name your user 0day to get root access”
It’s like putting security cams and interior locks all over your house instead of locking the front door. If your storage can’t be read without the passphrase then NOTHING can fail in such a way as to provide access. Simplicity and obvious correctness have virtues.
There isn’t much reason to use anything other than FDE with a sufficient passphrase, auto login so the user doesn’t have to type two distinct passwords, and go luks suspends to evict key from memory on suspend.
Boot up enter the passphrase -> see your desktop -> close the lid -> open the lid -> enter your passphrase
I don’t think you understand the TPM chain, there is absolutely value in validating that the firmware, bootloader, kernel, and initramfs haven’t changed and not decrypt the disk if they have. That’s what the TPM does, it doesn’t just store a key, it calculates it.
Obviously, the optimal setup is TPM calculation + passphrase, which completely avoids decrypting the drive if some compromise, or modification, happened somewhere in the bootchain, or if the disk is taken out of the computer.
I never suggested there wasn’t value in the TPM for anyone although I think such validation has small value for most folks use case. Normal users are worried about theft of laptop by criminals not spies bugging their machine. I suggested that any configuration without a passphrase was inherently insecure.
It’s not an “optimal setup” its the only setup that makes even the slightest sense because the alternative configuration can be defeated by a smart 12 year old with access to google.