True, but I don’t agree with you in the first place that number of physical interactions is a good way to measure computation (for instance, I would consider the heat-death of the universe to be the end of computation.). I also am not sure that computation is a particularly good proxy for moral weight, I just think that without it there is no consciousness.
for instance, I would consider the heat-death of the universe to be the end of computation
This is an easy mistake to make, heat death is actually a very cold noninteracting state, so your point doesn’t contradict physical interaction being computation. Though I trust that you really don’t see interaction and computation as the same.
Edit: just looked up some heat death info, there is actually quite a range of ideas there so I guess I can’t be confident on which one you meant.
In the beginning you said that experience rate was an important factor for moral weight, has that changed? If it hasn’t, how do you reconcile that with:
I also am not sure that computation is a particularly good proxy for moral weight,
Also, for my own curiosity: how do you distinguish interaction from computation?
I don’t see why computation is tied to experience rate. You already pointed out examples of what appear to be higher amounts of computation in the brain not apparently tied to experience rate.
I think computation is meaningful, whereas interaction can be high-entropy and meaningless. I would probably need to consult E.T. Jaynes to have more precise definitions of the difference between these notions.
You already pointed out examples of what appear to be higher amounts of computation in the brain not apparently tied to experience rate.
I actually would say that high interaction is high computation is high experience rate. I don’t see how they are separated.
I think computation is meaningful, whereas interaction can be high-entropy and meaningless. I would probably need to consult E.T. Jaynes to have more precise definitions of the difference between these notions.
I’d be extremely curious to see how you define “meaningful” in this context. This seems to drive your moral hierarchy. Correct me if I’m wrong of course.
True, but I don’t agree with you in the first place that number of physical interactions is a good way to measure computation (for instance, I would consider the heat-death of the universe to be the end of computation.). I also am not sure that computation is a particularly good proxy for moral weight, I just think that without it there is no consciousness.
First, a minor correction:
This is an easy mistake to make, heat death is actually a very cold noninteracting state, so your point doesn’t contradict physical interaction being computation. Though I trust that you really don’t see interaction and computation as the same.
Edit: just looked up some heat death info, there is actually quite a range of ideas there so I guess I can’t be confident on which one you meant.
In the beginning you said that experience rate was an important factor for moral weight, has that changed? If it hasn’t, how do you reconcile that with:
Also, for my own curiosity: how do you distinguish interaction from computation?
I don’t see why computation is tied to experience rate. You already pointed out examples of what appear to be higher amounts of computation in the brain not apparently tied to experience rate.
I think computation is meaningful, whereas interaction can be high-entropy and meaningless. I would probably need to consult E.T. Jaynes to have more precise definitions of the difference between these notions.
I actually would say that high interaction is high computation is high experience rate. I don’t see how they are separated.
I’d be extremely curious to see how you define “meaningful” in this context. This seems to drive your moral hierarchy. Correct me if I’m wrong of course.