That is, they think all of their decisions were preordained, and then use this to claim that they can’t be held responsible for anything they do.
That is, they think all of their decisions were preordained, and then use this to claim that they can’t be held responsible for anything they do.
To clarify: are you saying that there is a “you” who is a separate entity from your brain (and the rest of your body?)
Do you see it as your fingers are typing a reply and you’re just watching them do it on their own? You wouldn’t say that you’re the one typing?
I believe consciousness is a result of processes of the brain, and the brain is a very complex machine. It’s hard to say anything too concretely beyond that because I don’t really understand how it works. I live as though the brain and my consciousness are in perfect sync, but I’m unsure how true that is.
There are, for example, experiments where it can be shown that decisions are made before we are consciously aware that we have made them. Others show that severing a nerve between the hemispheres of our brain can result in two independent consciousnesses. Who can say where I end and my brain begins?
Your brain is you, though, just like your hands are you. Whether there’s a lag between the time that imaging detects you made a decision and you say you made one does not change the fact that you’re the one making the decision.
That’s one way of seeing things, and I respect that viewpoint, but I disagree. I primarily view myself as my consciousness; everything else is secondary. How do you know you aren’t a brain in a vat?
I’m a fallibilist: I don’t believe we can know anything for certain. The best we can do is base propositions off contingent statements: “If what I see is reliable, then what I see in the mirror is not a brain in a vat.”
A brain in a vat is not a very useful starting axioms, so I have no reason to give it serious consideration. By contrast, while taking the general accuracy of my own senses as axiomatic eventually leads me to conclude they can be fallible (example: hallucinations,) it is nonetheless a way more useful axiom for deriving a base of contingent knowledge.
The person making the claim has to advance the evidence. The default is the assumption that the way the universe presents itself is the way it is. If you want me to consider this possibility find supporting evidence for it.
Also we have evidence against that model.
Sure, but this is still an assumption I would need to agree to - though obviously a productive one - not necessarily true. The only thing I can know is my experience.
This isn’t particularly useful beyond explaining why I view my consciousness as primary and hands secondary or tertiary or something. The brain is tricky because again, I don’t know where it ends and my consciousness begins.
Incorrect. You can easily be deceived. The primary is physical reality that is the only thing that remains regardless of what you think. I have more evidence that the real world exists than I do that you are a thinking mind.
Descartes ruined philosophy. Reality exists everything else we should question.
If your perception is subject to failure, so to is the evidence, no matter how convincing. So yes, we act upon the assumption that reality exists. We both agree with this.
But that doesn’t mean it is true. And all I’m saying is for this very narrow point of what I care most about, Descartes does have a point. I care more about my mind than my foot. I mean, maybe you can think of a better way to frame the argument because I doubt you even disagree. If you have a gun and you are forced to shoot yourself anywhere on your body, would you choose your foot or your brain?
The better counter to me would be to prove external value. Would I sacrifice myself for someone else? If I believe reality doesn’t exist, the answer should presumably be no. If I believe reality does exist, the answer could be yes. Or alternatively, shooting myself in the foot suggests I believe in a causal relationship within reality towards shooting my brain and losing consciousness, which I shouldn’t necessarily believe.
But even then, it’s not that I disbelieve reality, it’s just that I can’t know for certain what’s real outside my mind, so there’s not really any contradiction between acting as if it is real and being uncertain if it is.
All this is doesn’t matter anyway: the point is less you could be a brain in a vat, but rather if you were a brain in a vat, would you be any less you? I don’t think so.
I have more evidence that I am a thinking mind than that I do that the real world exists. There’s no point arguing this point it won’t go anywhere.
The endocrine system. What do you think cause you to get horny, to get excited, to be afraid, to know to seek out sleep?
You have very little evidence for that. You have as much as you want that the real world exists.