So I’ve been thinking about when someone is justified to owning something, and this is my thought process (sorry if this is not the intended use of this community):

Imagine a person who finds a rock on the ground, when he picks it up & uses it to hurt another person they are morally culpable. Comparably, that same person has a body & if they use that body to hurt someone, they are morally culpable as well. It’s hard to say that people don’t own their body, as in they have the moral right to keep & use something (the body), since it’s an extension of their consciousness. How & when someone owns something is important, since the right of property is seen as a fundamental right & is the bedrock of our capitalist society. So using something we fundamentally agree is something that someone owns, we can to understand why & apply it to other things. When comparing these two examples, we’ll understand that what makes ownership exist is if it is used as a tool. Simply because the ownership of the body can be compared to an ownership of an item, which is especially explicit in a moral example in isolation.

Let’s say there’s someone named Elthri, and they will painlessly separate the arm of someone named Kral — which Kral does not want, however would be extremely useful for Elthri to use. This is to avoid other variables, such consequentialist thought of net harm; we’ll treat this as a net-zero in positive or negative outcomes. Everyone agrees, unless someone prescribes to an esoteric philosophy, that Elthri does not have any moral right to take away Kral’s arm for one reason: he has ownership of that arm; it’s his arm. The reason it’s his arm is that it’s connected to his consciousness, it’s a part of his moral weight — it’s an extension of his consciousness. That’s the same reason we can prescribe moral weight to his body, it’s an extension of his consciousness — if not that means if he punches someone he cannot be morally culpable. Since a disagreement of this premise necessarily means his hand hitting someone is not connected to his consciousness, meaning they are not morally capable. Him, as a person, cannot be blamed.

Items work the same way: when someone picks up a rock & hits someone with it, they are still morally culpable. The rock becomes an extension of the person’s consciousness. The only real difference is that the body gives sensory details to our experience, while we can only externally feel the rock. However, in the scenario Elthri & Kral scenario pain (or senses in general) is not the reason for why Elthri cannot keep Kral’s arm — meaning we must conclude that the extension to our consciousness is the actual reason something becomes owned. Kral owns his arm because it’s an extension of him, the same way a rock can be.

However, when does something become an extension of another person is still a standing question. Hurting someone is an obvious example, since there is moral weight, it’s easy to see the extension, but in the input, process, or result of hurting someone when does it become owned? The only answer is that it’s used as a tool, our body is inherently a tool because we must necessarily use it.

A rock is used, it becomes a tool, which means it becomes owned. In the rock-hurting example, it cannot be the outcome (as in hurting someone) in of itself, since someone can have a body but never have a moral outcome in a vacuum but still own their body. It cannot be the person’s effect on the rock, since a person who cannot feel, move, essentially cannot affect their body still owns it. However, the use of the body as a vessel means it is used meaning it’s a tool, meaning it’s explainable through tool-ownership.

I coin this as thinking as tool-ownership, unless it’s already an established philosophy that already has a name. Which is, in a vacuum, the use of a thing as a tool means the person owns the thing.

  • hakutyou@lemmy.fmhy.ml
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    1 year ago

    I don’t think you can say something is owned because it is an extension of one’s consciousness. A stolen object can still be used as an extension of the thief’s consciousness, yet the thief does not have a valid claim. Your theory is able to explain what is able to be owned, but it is not capable of establishing who the proper owner is.

    You could say that the proper owner is the first person to use an object as a tool, but by doing so your theory is essentially a restated version of the homesteading principle:

    [E]very man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to. . .

    He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then when did they begin to be his? . . .And 'tis plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common. That added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done: and so they become his private right. And will any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? . . . If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that 'tis the taking part of what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use.1

    Once an item becomes property, the owner may transfer the ownership to another person. therefore there are two legitimate ways of obtaining property: either by homesteading it, or by mutual exchange. If a dispute arises between two people, the burden of proof is on the accuser; if the accuser cannot prove that they have a legitimate claim to the item, then they may not use force to repossess it.

    I recommend you read The Ethics of Liberty by Murray N. Rothbard (or at least the first two parts) for an introduction to this theory of property as well as an introduction to natural rights. I would also recommend Against Intellectual Property by N. Stephan Kinsella, who states that what makes something ownable is its scarcity, and explains how this effects the idea of intellectual property.


    1. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil Government, V. pp. 27-28, in Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 305-7. Quoted in Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 2002), pp. 21ff.
    • Rist6OP
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      1 year ago

      Thank you for the recommendations. I agree with everything you said, except for the use of something which is simply restating what Locke has already said.

      As I understand it, Locke establishes ownership not by extrapolating from the ownership of the body, but by assuming that individuals own their own bodies and using that as a premise for why they also own other things. While ethical systems may have some overlapping agreements, I believe there are enough differences between my perspective and Locke’s that it is not simply a restatement of his ideas. I apologize if I have misinterpreted or misrepresented his views.

      I don’t understand why people assume that I am suggesting this as a factual means of establishing ownership. I am simply stating what creates a situation where individuals should have the moral right to own something.

      I will definitely read the recommendations you’ve provided, as my previous thoughts on ownership were just the result of casual reflection over a few days. I’m certain I will look into them.