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Cake day: July 7th, 2023

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  • I’m not basing it on vibes, I’m basing it on a plurality of polls that have been done around this issue over the last six months, which have consistently shown there is only downside risk for Harris for something like supporting an arms embargo. These recent polls are considered low-quality polls by low-rated pollsters.

    That said, I do hope you and these recent polls are right, but I’m dubious about it until we get more data. My inclination is to trust the preponderance of polls heretofore until there is more confirming data. It’s ugly, but because I see the election of Trump as existential for Palestine, stability in the middle east, and because there are nuclear weapons at play, I’m very keen to think first about Harris’s ability to win at this point in the election cycle than immediate action against Israel.

    I don’t like how it is at all, but I recognize that what is already an atrocity will get significantly worse if Trump wins. When the downside risk is four years of unmitigated disaster home and abroad, and with the election only weeks away, I think it’s reasonable to be cautious. I’ll also add, however, that public support of Israel has been consistently eroding for months now, so it’s quite possible sentiment has changed enough that it would have a negligible or positive impact on Harris’s campaign, but the consequences if the polling is wrong or fails to account for knock-on downsides are extreme.


  • I’m working from the premise that I think everyone can agree with: a Trump presidency will be disastrous for Palestine and Lebanon. With that said, while polls from the IMEU suggest that Harris could gain support from progressives and Independents by endorsing an arms embargo on Israel, these findings largely reflect voters who are already inclined to support her. The polling indicates that those who already lean toward Harris would be even more motivated by such a stance, but it overlooks the potential backlash from other critical voter groups.

    An arms embargo risks alienating moderate Democrats, segments of Jewish voters, and security-conscious Independents who see U.S.-Israel relations as crucial to national security. These groups could view Harris’s support for an embargo as undermining a long-standing alliance and weakening U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, Republicans would likely capitalize on this policy shift, using it to energize their base and paint Harris as weak on national security.

    In a national election, the net effect would likely be a loss of support in a race where she already has a roughly 50% chance of losing. The enthusiasm gained from progressives would likely be significantly outweighed by defections from moderates, the mobilization of well-funded, Israel-aligned PACs, and the energizing of conservative opposition.

    The IMEU polling appears to oversample individuals who are already inclined to support an arms embargo on Israel, such as progressives and some Independents. This skews the results by amplifying the potential enthusiasm from voters who are already in Harris’s camp, while under-representing moderates, Jewish voters, and security-focused individuals who might defect if she adopts this position.

    Unfortunately, the pool of voters who would vote for her only if she supports an arms embargo is much smaller than the larger, more diverse groups that could shift away from her if she takes this stance. But, it would be a calculated risk that maybe she should take. No one knows exactly how this would shake out in the election. Based on a broad examination of multiple polls, I’m inclined to believe this will lose her the election.

    I think that the fact one element of Russian disinformation campaigns has been to amplify the question of Gaza in political discourse points to the fact that it’s a “loser” issue for Harris, where she loses if she doesn’t do anything and she loses if she does. But opinions and sentiment change, and maybe there has been enough of a shift in public sentiment that it won’t mortally wound her campaign anymore, but it’s a gamble anyway you slice it. If she takes the risk and loses the election, all of this is moot. Trump will arm and give full-throated support to Israel without regard for what they do.





  • I’m convinced Israel is pushing as hard as they can because they know they’ll either 1) continue getting the weapons and, therefore, tacit endorsement of their actions from/by the US, or 2) Biden actually tries to embargo arms to Israel, thereby losing the election for Harris, and then they’ll get the weapons and explicit endorsement from Trump in a few months.

    Politically, the only way they lose is if they stop being aggressive and genocidal, because that would increase the chance of a Harris victory, which means they then might not get to keep picking fights and a Harris administration with four years in front of them might very well enact an arms embargo, hurting Israel’s military in the much longer term.

    Sadly, the only long-term chance of the US doing something about Israel will need to be a) after the election, and b) only if Harris wins. Otherwise Trump will basically allow them to double down on everything they’re doing with even less outcry. Standing on principle here actually increases the harm to Lebanon and Palestine in the long term.

    The US will be busy dealing with mass deportations, the carving out and amputation of many federal departments, and the jailing of opposition politicians. And that’s before it possibly gets worse. So even the limited outcry and opposition in the US will decrease with a Trump victory.




  • Sure, fairly easy to explain. Historically, favorability ratings have only a loose connection to actual voting behavior. For example, Donald Trump had consistently low favorability numbers during the 2016 campaign, and many analysts assumed this would prevent him from winning. He also currently has a 10-point unfavorability rating. Yet, he secured the presidency in 2016, and is currently even and trending up in electoral college projections, showing that favorability ratings don’t predict and are often only loosely correlated with electoral outcomes. Similarly, current favorability ratings suggest Harris is struggling in terms of public perception and trending down, but those polls alone don’t fully represent the complex dynamics of a presidential race. Note that your 538 visualization uses a two-year timeline, meaning you’re missing a lot of granularity in favorability since she took over the candidacy. Since that initial jump when she took over for Biden, her numbers have been much more ambidirectional on that front: from low-to-mid 50s to high 40s, etc.

    Looking at the current polling data, Vice President Harris is trailing Trump in several critical battleground states like Arizona and Georgia, with Trump holding a 5-point and 4-point lead in these states, respectively. While she holds a slim national lead in some aggregate polls, such as a 3.7% edge in national polling (less than Biden won by), this has not translated into a clear advantage in all key regions and, thereby, the electoral college. Importantly, Biden performed better in similar polls during the 2020 election campaign than Harris is currently performing against Trump.

    Compared to Hillary Clinton at the same point in 2016, Harris is polling similarly or worse in some battlegrounds, i.e., on the whole worse. Clinton also struggled with unfavorable ratings but she managed to maintain stronger polling in many regions than Harris currently is up until late in the race.

    The issue with relying solely on favorability ratings is that they only capture general sentiment toward a candidate and not the decisive factors like voter enthusiasm, turnout strategies, or key policy stances that can ultimately sway elections. They also don’t capture voter intention, but rather how a broad sampling “feels” about a candidate at any given point in time. Moreover, favorability ratings can fluctuate based on short-term controversies or media coverage and don’t always reflect the strategic or demographic realities that decide elections. In short, while these ratings can provide insights, they shouldn’t be overemphasized as predictors of electoral success, and they’re certainly not useful as a counter-argument to the simple fact that Harris is doing worse than Clinton and Biden at similar points during their respective campaigns.

    While it’s frustrating and seemingly unbelievable given who she’s running against, Harris is currently in serious danger of losing the election.



  • I like how democrats are suddenly making noise weeks before the election about voter fraud and disenfranchisement in Georgia and elsewhere, the traitors in congress, and all the other ways Republicans have been subverting the electoral process. Too little, too late.

    This is extra concerning because it seems more likely than not Trump will win this election. I’m not counting on democrats to be able to mount an effective defense of the country as a whole when Trump starts playing dirty pool from the oval office.

    Just remember, at best this election is a coin flip, but I tend to agree with the democratic insiders that are confident Harris’s numbers are both soft and inaccurately high. Not to mention even with these theoretically inflated numbers, she’s still doing worse than Hillary and Biden at this point in the election. As we may all recall, Hillary lost and Biden won by barely 44,000 votes.

    Effective resistance is going to be very important, and the democrats look about as ignorant and ineffective as ever.