Iran already has enough uranium enriched to up to 60%, if enriched further, to make three nuclear bombs, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s theoretical definition, and more at lower enrichment levels. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.

Iran is enriching to up to 60%, close to the roughly 90% that is weapons grade, at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in its sprawling Natanz complex and at its Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), which is dug into a mountain.

“The Agency confirms that, since the end of November 2023, the rate at which Iran has been producing uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 at these two facilities combined has increased to approximately 9 kg per month,” the report to member states said.

Critical mass for U-235 is 56kg, and fuel grade Uranium is between 3-5%.

There are no legitimate non-weapons applications of Uranium enriched above 20%.

  • gravitas_deficiencyEnglish
    64·
    11 个月前

    Honestly, the nuclear non-proliferation movement is dead and gone, and has been since February 2022 (really, since February 2014):

    • If Ukraine had managed to keep their hands on even a handful of nukes instead of handing them off to Russia as a result of the Budapest Memorandum, Russia would not be invading Ukraine right now, because the consequence would be “Russian cities start turning into glass”.
    • If the other signatories of the Budapest memorandum (the US and UK - I’m intentionally leaving Russia out for obvious reasons) had done more than effectively nothing in 2014, and had provided much more robust support - up to and including direct intervention to support Ukraine - in 2022, Russia would not be fucking around like this.

    The Ukraine War has proven that nuclear weapons are the absolute final word in maintaining sovereignty, territorial integrity, and unilateral geopolitical power.

    If Ukraine had any, Russia would not be able to prosecute the war without wildly disproportionate negative (nuclear) consequences from Ukraine.

    If Russia didn’t have any, they would not be able to prosecute the war without proportionate negative (conventional; regime-change) internationally-driven consequences.

    TL;DR: nuclear non-proliferation doesn’t work if you don’t strictly and vigorously enforce defense arrangements that are directly related to said non-proliferation.