So, I was told to not use Signal, so all that is left is Matrix. And I am not techy enough to have my own server and neither are my relatives, so Matrix.org is the only option
Private against who?
Privacy communities need to really drill in the idea of threat models instead of pretending privacy is some linear scale and the ultimate goal is to bury your phone and computer in a lead-lined concrete block underground. Privacy and security are meaningless concepts unless you know who your are protecting it from and what their capabilities might be. I don’t need to hide from NSA Tailored Access Operations because I’m not trying to x the y of the USA. I do need to protect myself from basic scam attackers, copyright trolls and neo-nazi stalkers. And Matrix, along with certain basic opsec guidelines, does that and more for me.
Matrix/Element is pretty private, but not wide spreaded. For the use with friends and Family is more realisticto use Signal or any other decentralized Chat.
both are good, even Signal. For private conversations, you only need to avoid Telegram and other obvious ones
What are the biggest threats in telegram? Corporations, widespread scams or individual ppl closer to me?
telegram has a lot of illegal stuff on it. Plus the ceo has been caught and this way, the whole thing was compromised
Matrix.org is centralized like Signal (you can say Matrix is not centralized on paper, but in practice this isn’t remotely true). Both are stockpiling metadata in the West… what’s worse is Matrix’s eventual consistency model means syncing metadata to all servers is a by-design requirement (& also why all servers & clients are slow). There are options like Snikket to take all the hard parts of self-hosting out of the equation, but finding someone you can trust to host a server might be worthwhile. I would be wary of anything centralized.
Signal is fine to use. These days I mostly recommend Delta Chat though. Delta Chat is free, encrypted, open source, audited, decentralised & federated in the same way as email is as it literally is email, it just looks like a chat, and it will work almost out of the box for anyone who has an email address (which is most people). This includes gmail/icloud/outlook etc. There are also chatmail servers you can sign up on if you’d prefer that.
It is no more complicated to configure than it is to configure any other email client. It has group chats, you can even share applications in the chat such as playing games or collaborate etc, all within the security of knowing your email provider can not read your conversations, whilst you still get the benefit of using the existing infrastructure of email.
Check it out: delta.chat/en/
PS. I’m not affiliated with them in any way. In fact, I have no idea if/how they make money. The service “just works” though.
PPS. They are also present in the Fediverse at @delta
Matrix and Simplex is fine but I would recommend Signal for family and friends. Threema is also option but not user friendly for friends and family who wants easy user discovery than sharing userIDs.
If it’s low privacy needs (ie you don’t have a state threat model), Signal is completely fine. I use it to talk to my friends. I also use Matrix, though federated Matrix isn’t the best for privacy either due to the amount of metadata that leaks through federation. But federated Matrix is also fine for the kinds of things you would use eg Discord or IRC for.
If you do have a state threat model, I personally think SimpleX is ideal for that, but it doesn’t have as much of a userbase so you probably need people who care enough (eg people actively under threat) to switch to a new platform. Whereas most people I know are already on either Signal or Matrix, and I’m not having particularly sensitive conversations with them either so both work fine.
Matrix isn’t more secure/private than Signal. Both have advantages and disadvantages. Signal has a centralized server, but has no access to the keys to decrypt any of the data flowing through them. Matrix chat rooms live on servers that would theoretically be able to access the data in the rooms, so you need to trust the server owners. Advantage is that multiple servers are involved so no one sever can kill your chat room. With Signal, the disadvantage is if you join a chat room, you can’t see any past messages because those are encrypted with keys you don’t have access to. Similarly if you move to a new device, that device won’t have any of your past conversations because the new device doesn’t have the keys for those messages. (though migration is now somewhat possible but done poorly IMHO).
So, they address different concerns. Is your concern keeping your conversations private, or keeping your conversations from being censored? Signal is more secure and private, but more centralized and easier or to fail. Matrix can be secure if you host your own server or explicitly trust the owners of all servers that house your chatrooms to keep them secure and to not sell their servers in the future. Matrix is more distributed, so more difficult to be censored or have your data lost by a single point of failure.
Is it “secure enough” depends on what your concerns are. If you host your own, then it’s as secure as you are technically able to keep them secure yourself. Otherwise it depends on the server owner.
Who told you to not use Signal, and what reasons did they give? I’m very curious.
It uses phone numbers and is centralized. I personally dont use it cus of those reasons. Also wouldnt switch cus my folk already use matrix so im nt making a bunch of people get another app lol
Matrix is centralized too in practice … & syncs even more metadata than Signal so I wouldn’t call that an upgrade—especially when you see how slow the clients & servers are.
Matrix is centralized too in practice
There are plenty of different available homeservers and you can host yours.
It takes 2 to tango. It’s like trying to send an email from a self-hosted email server without following all of Google’s rules/guidelines… which means you won’t be able to send a message to most (sadly). Most folks are either on Matrix.org or a server they host in practice… you alone self-hosting will only help if you only communicate to folks also doing similar… to which if just one user from Matrix.org (or a server they host) joins your chatroom, then literally everything that is being & has been said in that room will now be synced to Matrix.org by its protocol design. With the expense it takes to self-host Matrix for a community, almost all medium-sized communities had to drop it on RAM & storage costs alone which caused most of those users to move to Matrix.org. You can run a single-user host with some efficiency, but most users are not technical enough for this. The only option to use Matrix & keep costs down is to unfederate… at least with Matrix.org (& servers they host), but that now defeats a huge part of the argument those saying Matrix is federated/decentralized.
It isn’t decentralized in clients or servers either. Almost all servers must run Synapse which is resource intensive but actually has the features folks expect as the de facto reference server & Element is the only viable client considering most users will be using Element-exclusive features like threading, polls, etc. where protocol hasn’t done a great job of providing a progressive enhancement approach to its features & so folks on alternative clients straight-up just don’t see / can’t interact with this stuff.
The accessibility to small–medium-sized communities matters if you want a healthy federated/decentralized network …but luckily there are alternatives.
It takes 2 to tango. It’s like trying to send an email from a self-hosted email server without following all of Google’s rules/guidelines…
Don’t say bullshit, a chat is not mails, matrix federation works similarly to lemmy
DeltaChat literally turns email into something more akin to chat mostly by just changing the UX. Matrix is less like chat tho & more like editing a document & syncing changes with someone but this is besides the point…
Lemmy would have the exact same issue if 90% of users were on Lemmy.ml or servers they hosted, but it is fairly distributed & not as heavy to run (nor does it have some startup mentality behind it trying to ‘disrupt’ chat by inventing new words like “bridges” instead of “gateways” & so on to put off casual users from the scent that chat has a well-worn path development for decentralization since the ’80s)
Signal is most likely a fed honeypot.
They are super shady, blocked some important security researchers that found a vulnerability from them on all platforms, and they offer no explanation on why using a phone number is MANDATORY for signup.
No reason to trust signal IMO.
FUD is FUD
Signal is perfectly fine to use.
It is not. We are on a privacy sub on lemmy, services that require mandatory phone number are far away from been fine to use.
Can you please provide any data where Signal has been compromised? I’m not saying that the possibility doesn’t exist, but I’ve certainly never seen one single instance where Signal was compromised, so please do share.
Go ahead and send me your phone number. If you don’t want to do it please provide data that i’m compromised.
Most packages/installs of Signal contain proprietary code. I suggest Molly-FOSS instead.
Suggestion accepted, looks nice.
Molly also has some quality-of-life improvements - such as allowing to enter a device pairing link manually instead of scanning a QR code (thus allowing use in a VM for registration without a smartphone), or being able to use a generic Socks proxy instead of Signal’s own solution. Not only does that allow running Signal over Tor without using Orbot as a “VPN”, but is also more versatile (I wouldn’t want to set up a separate proxy just for Signal, and also their implementation is apparently inferior to some advanced obfuscation solutions).
P.S. Also idk if this has been fixed, but Signal’s app bugged out during registration and got stuck on “no google services” warning on my Graphene device, yet Molly went through flawlessly.
You can also set up MollySockets for notifications via unified push!
I think there is campaign to get people to use signal, while servers are proprietary and other things are questionable.
It is a great operation for convincing the majority.
Servers are always going to be owned by someone. But the data is encrypted with keys not available to the server. Signal isn’t perfect, and I don’t like some stuff they do, but it’s the best design out there that is also relatively user friendly and doesn’t have holes that are easy to exploit by the server owner.
For normal end user average usage signal is the best option available, specially for family since they may already be used to the flow and UX of it. Simple and straight forward. All the “bad” things you read are about nerds being annoying and not liking a very particular specific thing and thinking that specific thing should be the only focus.
So just make people use signal. It’s the best and simplest way with the most common features for individuals and small groups. A simple download, in a common known place on a store without confusing people with differences between a protocol and a client and with and onboarding experience most are already familiar and ok using.
Even so you still need to make sure that the app does not have battery optimizations turned on, but that applies to all apps used for communication that are not blessed in specific phones (like facebook and whatsapp already having that setting by default because vendors make it so).
I have made so many people use Signal now. I sell it as, “I’m on Android. Signal gives us all of the features of iMessage and facetime” no need to mention the privacy concerns unless they are the kind of person who cares.
Great for now. Much better than doomers here who do nothing but cope.
But this teaches nothing to protect them from new scams, new anti-libre software.
In signal, You can turn off phone number visibility and make it so that you are only searchable by username or qr code. Yes, it’s centralized, but signal is a nonprofit project with generally good guiding ideals. I use matrix for some things and signal for everything else.
Yeah, but it is still just one account per number, so it would make managing alts annoying. Not only is the main client (as well as the major unofficial ones, haven’t found one that doesn’t do that) not support multiacc directly, forcing use of profiles or VMs, but you’re also at risk of whoever rents the associated phone number after you deleting the account (that or you could pay a recurring fee just to retain the number, which is just wasteful).
I am really concerned about the dominance of the central instance on Matrix. It has visibility into pretty much every groupchat - if not in content because of encryption, then in all the metadata. I’d rather use another public homeserver.
simplex is good as an alternative
It’s worth following the project but it’s a bit too new & the funding aspect leads me to question how it will work in the long run (& being written in Haskell is neat, but boy does it have a lot of churn & maintenance issues in its ecosystem).
SimpleX has some interesting ideas, but also some shortcomings for people who want a practical messaging service. For example:
- It is funded by venture capital, which calls into question its longevity, and even if it does manage to stick around, suggests that it will be leveraged to exploit people once the user base is large enough.
- Its queue servers delete messages if they are not delivered within a certain time frame (21 days by default). Good luck if you take a vacation off-grid for a few weeks.
- No multi-device support. (This means a single account accessed concurrently from multiple independent devices.) The closest it comes is locally tethering a mobile device to a computer.
- Establishing new contacts requires sharing a large link or QR code, which is not always convenient.
- No support for group calls.
I would not recommend it for talking to family members and people in general, which is what OP requested.
Probably yes, it depends on your threat model.
If you are using E2EE on a matrix.org account then your message content, attachments (images) and most other traffic isn’t accessible to anyone but the people in the chat. However Matrix isn’t the most private option, it has a number of leaks such as reactions and chat topics (these are being worked on but aren’t close to happening).
For most people Matrix is a very private and secure option and the fact that it is federated is a huge plus. If you want something more secure you are probably looking at Signal (which you don’t want to use and isn’t federated) or Simplex Chat (which doesn’t have multi-device support).
Unfortunately even with E2EE, the admins of a homeserver can still impersonate you or take over your channel.
Of course you could run your own instance, or maybe none of this is part of your threat model, but I felt like bringing it up either way.
That isn’t what that document says. It says that they can impersonate you in non-E2EE scenarios. The clients I use warn me when a message isn’t properly encrypted so someone without E2EE keys can’t impersonate someone in an E2EE room.
That being said the general concept is a problem. I would love to see progress where all events from a user are signed by a device key and non-forgable. There is some thinking about this with portable identities (such as MSC2787) where you server is basically just storing and forwarding events but the root of trust is your identity and keys that you control. But none of this will land soon, not for many years.
even with E2EE, the admins of a homeserver can still impersonate you
No, they cannot. Your homeserver admin could create an impostor login session on your account, but it would be pointless with E2EE, because it would be flagged with an obviously visible warning. You and all of your contacts would see that the impostor session was not verified as you (this typically shows up as a bright red icon on the impostor and another one on the room they’re in). Also, the impostor would be unable to read your communications.
What do you have to say about this then?
In an encrypted room even with fully verified members, a compromised or hostile home server can still take over the room by impersonating an admin. That admin (or even a newly minted user) can then send events or listen on the conversations.
Perhaps we have a different definition of “impersonate”… not everyone will pay attention to unverified warnings, and afaik they can still communicate with people (just maybe not read old messages)… but I would love to be proven wrong.
a compromised or hostile home server can still take over the room
A compromised server could affect a denial of service attack against its users, of course. The attacker could do the same thing by simply turning off the server. That’s true on all platforms that use servers. A reasonable response would be to switch to a different server.
That admin (or even a newly minted user) can then send events
Exactly what events do you think would be dangerous?
or listen on the conversations.
No. End-to-end encryption ensures that only the intended endpoints can read the messages. Older Matrix clients have a setting to block the user from sending messages to unverified devices/sessions, in case they somehow don’t understand the meaning of a bright red warning icon. I think newer ones (e.g. Element X) enforce that mode; if you’re concerned about this, you could check for yourself, but…
not everyone will pay attention to unverified warnings
…unfortunately, there are no guarantees when trying to fix human behavior. If you need a messaging app to make it hard for your contacts to do something obviously foolish, then I suggest waiting until Matrix 2.0 is officially released and implemented in the clients. The beta versions of Element X, for example, look like everything is locked down to avoid human mistakes like the one you’re describing.
End-to-end encryption ensures that only the intended endpoints can read the messages
But who/what gets to decide who the intended recipients are? Can’t the homeserver admin just join the channel and then the other members would exchange keys automatically and now they can see what people say?
But who/what gets to decide who the intended recipients are?
The sender, of course.
Can’t the homeserver admin just join the channel and then the other members would exchange keys automatically and now they can see what people say?
No. Verification prevents that.
I don’t understand. How would the sender prevent messages from going to the admin user that joined the room? It sounds like you’re implying new users simply can’t join a room? That makes no sense to me… I’ve certainly never experienced that. I see new users join encrypted rooms all the time and they can talk just fine… so what’s the deal? And isn’t verification off by default?
