Context: In 1983, the Soviet Union detected incoming missiles. Rather than relaying the information, the officer on duty decided not to take action, thereby preventing a nuclear war.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident
From my own experience with hardware and real life in general, I imagine they probably had some equipment who they already knew was not working 100% and it was the only one to detect such missiles. I can’t imagine any other reason why they wouldn’t report it without risk of being labeled a traitor afterwards.
This is pretty close to Petrov’s account of his reasoning, plus that the early warning system only showed four or five missiles inbound and he expected a hypothetical American first strike to be way bigger
If it was real, others would likely report it. If no one else is freaking out and phones aren’t ringing, it likely isn’t real.
This is the advantage of everyone really, really not wanting a nuclear war. We assume its not really until the evidence it is is overwhelming. And maybe even then.
A friend of mine has (had? it was a while ago) an uncle who was one of the key turners in a midwest ICBM silo in the early 1970s. Having turned into a pacifist hippie (while still working for STRATCOM) he admitted during every psychiatric review he totally wasn’t going to turn that key, not now, not ever, even when staring down a Soviet first strike, because he was totally not going to be that guy that killed thirty million people.
And for reasons my buddy nor her uncle can fathom, they kept him at post.
I mean do you really want to spend time going through the process of removing this guy and then spending ages trying to find and train someone for the most boring job in the military?
These guys constantly train while on shift because there’s nothing else to do except turn up for your shift and wait for someone to give the order to start Armageddon.
I finally got the wildfire in my sock drawer under control
Out of the ordinary, I mean
